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Abstract. Online social networks increasingly allow mobile users to
share their location with their friends. Much to the detriment of users’
privacy, this also means that social network operators collect users’ lo-
cation. Similarly, third parties can learn users’ location from localization
and location visualization services. Ideally, third-parties should not be
given complete access to users’ location. To protect location privacy, we
design and implement a platform-independent solution for users to share
their location in a private fashion over online social networks. Our so-
lution relies on encryption to enforce access control and uses dummy
queries and caching to protect localization and location visualization.
1 Introduction
Cellphone users increasingly share their location on the Internet with location-
based services (LBSs) or online social networks (OSNs). These third-parties use
location information to infer users’ context and provide customized services [21].
We focus on location-sharing services (LSSs) that enable friends to share their
locations with each other [18,27,38,39]: such services combine location-based
services with online social networks.
While accessing LSSs, users often rely on two other components: a localization
component, with which users obtain their location [4,12] and a visualization
component, with which users render their location on a map and that of their
friends [1,5,17,41].
Much to the detriment of users’ privacy, third-parties running location-sharing
services can collect users’ location. Similarly, some localization services locate
users based on wireless access points in users’ proximity and thus learn users’
location. Also, users often visualize their location and that of their friends on
online maps thus revealing locations to the map operator. Because visited loca-
tions are correlated to users’ identity, third-parties can not only localize users but
also profile them over time [29,34,36,37]. Online social networks already know
users’ identity and their social graph, but with location information, they obtain
a deeper insight into users’ activities.
Ideally, location-sharing services should not be given complete access to users’
location. Previous work on location-based services proposed to disclose minimum
information relying on obfuscation and anonymization [20,30,32,33,34,35,42,44].
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Fig. 1. System model. Users upload their location to a central server that provides
location-sharing services. Users A, B and C can then see each others location.
These solutions aim at reducing the information shared with LBSs while still
proposing a minimum quality of service. In the case of LSSs, the requirements
differ: users aim at sharing their location with friends over third-parties that do
not provide specific services but only facilitate users’ interactions. Thus, obfus-
cation and anonymization are not viable options.
In this work, we design a platform-independent solution for users to share
their location in a private fashion over LSSs. Our solution does not require
any changes to the infrastructure and can operate with any third-party LSS.
We implement our solution as a prototype application for mobile phones code-
named PrivL (Private Locations). It uses encryption to protect users’ location
from third-party servers while still allowing them to share it with friends. It
can also make use of distributed Hash tables (DHTs) to provide ephemeral data
storage [28]. We also discuss the problem of protecting privacy with respect
to localization and map visualization services and propose a solution based on
dummy queries and caching. We discuss the challenge of generating dummy
queries to confuse an adversary and use the concept of virtual identities.
2 Models
2.1 System Model
We study a network (Fig. 1) that involves mobile users equipped with wireless
devices, third-party operators running location-sharing services and a wireless
infrastructure. Let us define U = {U1, U2, ..., Un} as the set of users in the
network, where n is the total number of users. For simplicity, we consider that
each user owns a single communication device. We study a discrete time system
with initial time t = 0 and consider the location of users at each discrete time t.
Wireless devices feature localization technology such as GPS, or wireless
triangulation that lets users locate themselves [4,12]. The geographic location of
a user is denoted by l = (lon, lat), where lon is the longitude, and lat is the
latitude. The wireless infrastructure relies on technology such as WiFi, GSM
or 3G to let users connect to the Internet. LSSs are operated by independent
third-party entities that intend to provide services based on users’ location.
3Cellphone users send their location to an LSS operator through the wireless
infrastructure. For each request sent, users may have to identify themselves to
the LSS using proper credentials. For example, some services may require users
to have an account, and to provide the corresponding username and password
with each request, whereas other services may be open to everyone and use
HTTP cookies to recognize several visits from the same user. In general, we
assume that users are identified with pseudonyms (i.e., fictitious identifiers),
such as their username, their HTTP cookie or their IP address. In this work, we
focus on LSSs enabling users to share their location with friends such as Google
Latitude [38], FireEagle [26], and Loopt [39]. We define a function F (Ui) that
provides the set of friends of every user Ui.
Each location sample shared by a user is called an event. Each event is
denoted by a triplet < i, t, l >, where i is the pseudonym of a user, t is the
time instance at which the event occurred, and l is the location of the event. We
consider a simple communication model in which users upload their location to
LSSs with a post request:
1. U : Compute location l
2. U → LSS: Post < i, t, l >
3. LSS → U : Ack
Users can obtain the location of their friends with a get request:
1. U → LSS: Get location of F (U)
2. LSS → U : < j, t, l >, ∀j ∈ F (U)
3. U : Visualize on online map
Users then visualize their location and that of their friends on an online [1,5,17]
or oﬄine [41] map based on event triplets.
2.2 Threat Model
In this work, we investigate the ability of third-parties to learn users’ location.
We consider the potential privacy threat of each component of LSS applications.
In the localization component, a third-party operator running the localization
service learns users’ location [13]. In the sharing component, LSS operators pas-
sively collect information about the locations of pseudonymous users over time.
In the visualization component, a third-party operator running an online map
learns users’ location.
We consider that the adversary passively collects data from users and may
be active or retro-active [28]: the adversary can interact with users to obtain
their current location or interact with the servers storing the location data to
obtain their past location. The adversary knows the probability that users visit
specific locations on a map based on statistical information obtain from various
sources such as Citysense [2], geographic information systems [23], or the Census
bureau [29]. The adversary may also host a social network (e.g. Loopt [39]) and
thus knows users’ social graph and identity.
43 Our Solution
We rely on well-known privacy-preserving mechanisms to protect the privacy of
LSS users: we use broadcast encryption to share users’ location over third-parties
and dummy queries with caching to obtain and visualize users location. Our
solution does not require any changes from the infrastructure, and can operate
with any LSS. We implement these mechanisms in a prototype application for
mobile phones.
3.1 Privacy-Preserving Location Sharing
We propose to use encryption mechanisms to protect data privacy. We make use
of cellphones communication capabilities to establish the keying material. We
also suggest the use of ephemeral storage to thwart retroactive adversaries.
Encryption Mechanisms Cryptographic mechanisms can limit the access of
LSSs to location information. By encrypting the location information, only qual-
ified users (e.g., friends) can decrypt it: a user Ui can share his location only with
his friends F (Ui). To do so, we use Broadcast encryption schemes [25]. The chal-
lenge of broadcast encryption is to limit the size of the communication packet, of
the encryption overhead, the number of keys and to allow for the revocation of
users. Several solutions exist offering various tradeoffs among these constraints.
Symmetric Scheme The simplest broadcast encryption scheme consists in us-
ing symmetric cryptography: Ui establishes a pair-wise secret with each of his
friends. User Ui then posts its location encrypted with the pair-wise secrets.
Still, this approach does not scale well: the number of key establishments,
the packet size and the computation overhead increase linearly with the number
of friends.
Trivial Asymmetric Scheme Assume that each user owns a public and private key
pair. A simple broadcast encryption scheme based on asymmetric cryptography
consists in using hybrid encryption: location information is encrypted with a
secret and the secret is encrypted with the public keys of each user.
This scheme simplifies the establishment and management of secrets for
groups of users. Still, as before, it generates packet sizes and computation over-
head linear in the number of friends.
Dynamic Scheme Recently, advanced schemes were proposed achieving shorter
cipher texts and key length [22] and offering to dynamically add new users to
the set of friends at a low cost [24]. Nevertheless, such schemes still lack efficient
implementations and are thus not easy to deploy in practice.
In LSSs, we believe that users will most of the time share their location
with a subset of all their friends. Consequently there will be a small number
5of destinations, and as shown in [24], the trivial asymmetric scheme and the
symmetric scheme are preferable in such case. Hence, our solution makes use
of the symmetric scheme and the trivial asymmetric scheme implemented with
OpenSSL.
Key Establishment Secret keys can be retrieved from a central repository
or directly exchanged between users when they are in physical proximity using
peer-to-peer wireless communications.
In this work, we consider that users communicate their keys in a peer-to-peer
fashion using Bluetooth, text messages (SMSs), or phone calls. In other words,
we rely on the existing cellular infrastructure or physical proximity to guarantee
the authenticity of the keying material.
Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) The encrypted location data can be stored
directly on the third-party LSS. However, a retro-active adversary may try to
obtain the location data from the LSS in the future. As the data is stored
encrypted, the retro-active adversary will also have to obtain the secret used
for encryption to obtain users’ location.
The encrypted location data can alternatively be stored on an ephemeral
medium such as a DHT. Distributed Hash Tables are a peer-to-peer (P2P) stor-
age network consisting of multiple participating nodes. They offer a natural time
to live (TTL) of data as peers enter and exit the DHT over time. DHTs have
two advantages: the encrypted location information cannot be obtained by a
retro-active adversary [28] and if an LSS refuses to host encrypted material, we
can upload on the LSS links to a DHT. In other words, DHTs offer a temporary
storage solution in which the LSS becomes a transparent server that maintains
the relation with friends but does not contain any location information.
In our solution, users can choose to upload their location either on a DHT
or on the LSS directly.
3.2 Privacy-Preserving Localization
Most cell phones are equipped with GPS and can locate themselves privately.
Yet, GPSs are battery consuming, work poorly indoors and are slow to obtain
users’ location. Hence, mobile devices sometimes rely on wireless signal trian-
gulation for localization: users reveal contextual information such as the list of
WiFi access points in proximity to a localization server that computes users’
location [4,12].
A mobile device can protect its location privacy with respect to localization
servers by altering localization requests in two ways: i) modify the list of WiFi ac-
cess points in proximity or ii) send multiple queries in parallel. The first solution
will degrade the localization precision. The second solution can be implemented
using dummy localization requests and caching.
6Caching In order to avoid contacting localization servers altogether, users can
cache all access points locations in predefined regions of interest. We use publicly
available sources of information to create such caches. In practice, users tend to
have repeated mobility patterns, and caching should thus significantly reduce
the number of queries sent to localization servers.
However, caching may not scale well as mobile devices may not have enough
memory to store all the required information. Similarly, the cache may not con-
tain localization information for some regions because the publicly available
source does not contain localization information about that region. In this case,
dummy requests could be used.
Dummy Queries Following the principle of k-anonymity, users can create k−1
queries to the localization server. This way, the server will be uncertain as to
where exactly the user is. To create queries, users can rely on public databases
of existing access points [16]. The adversary may still be able to infer the real
location of users out of the k queries using statistical inference attacks. We
distinguish between two scenarios: users can be traceable or untraceable.
Traceable Virtual Identities Users are often traceable by third-party providers
based on their IP address. The IP address tends to remain the same on data
connections of mobile networks (3G and GSM). HTTP cookies can also be used
by third-parties to link multiple interactions with the same user.
By linking multiple user requests, the localization service can statistically
obtain users’ real location out of the k possible locations by analyzing queries
over time. For example, if k−1 locations of dummy queries are chosen at random,
the adversary can estimate that they do not correspond to real human-generated
queries based on the probability of visiting certain locations.
To avoid such attacks, users can choose k−1 queries in a strategic fashion. For
example, users can select frequently visited locations. Nevertheless, the adversary
may still statistically determine if locations in queries correspond to human
mobility by looking at the mobility patterns of visited locations. To avoid such
inference, users have to maintain a set of virtual identities. Each virtual identity
will have its own querying profile, matching human mobility statistics.
In summary, virtual identities must respect a number of constraints. Spatially,
the locations visited by virtual identities should correspond to realistic human
locations. Temporally, the distance between two consecutive locations should be
feasible according to the average speed of humans. Finally, the mobility of virtual
identities should statistically match traditional mobility statistics.
Untraceable There are multiple techniques to reduce user traceability. Users can
rely on DHCP to force IP address changes, or use Tor to obtain a larger IP
addresses anonymity set. Similarly, users can erase their HTTP cookies.
If users are not traceable, the localization server must do a double inference.
It must first estimate the relation between multiple user requests over time and
then statistically derive users’ possible locations.
73.3 Privacy-Preserving Visualization
In the case of online maps, the visualization of location information reveals users’
location and that of his friends to the map operator. We suggest to make use of
dummy map requests and local map caching to protect location privacy.
A user Ui must render the map of his own location and also render the map
corresponding to location of his friends: < j, t, l > ∀Uj ∈ F (Ui). We call mj the
map request to the online map provider containing the lat, lon coordinates of
Uj ’s location, a radius and a zoom level.
Caching Again caching can be used to reduce the number of queries sent to the
map server. A priori, users can define regions of interest where map caching is
done. The size of the maps being quite large, this solution may also have prob-
lems to scale.
Dummy Queries Inspired by the k-anonymity principle, Ui can use dummy
m’s to confuse the map operator. In this setting, dummy queries must protect
the location privacy of user Ui and that of Ui’s friends as well.
Like in the localization case, the adversary can use statistical information to
infer the real location of a user out of the k queries. In the map visualization
scenario, the adversary can even correlate the mobility of a user with that of his
friends.
Social Virtual Identities To avoid such attacks, users can maintain sets of virtual
identities for them and their friends that have a social life. Indeed, the interaction
between virtual identities must also be modeled to appear as a realistic profile
for the adversary.
In our prototype application, we implement a dummy request algorithm that
chooses k − 1 other queries from a set of frequently visited locations. We also
cache every query made by the user locally. We are currently investigating the
use of virtual identities in our application.
3.4 Implementation
In order to test the feasibility of the proposed privacy-preserving mechanisms, we
implemented a prototype client running on mobile phones code-named PrivL.1
We have chosen the Symbian platform because it is a popular platform for
mobile phones and it supports QT [10], a cross-platform application framework
(Fig. 2). We show in Fig. 3 (a) & (b) two screenshots of the resulting application.
Note that in the settings, users can establish security associations, connect to
LSSs, give a preference on the positioning mode and privacy level.
1 The source code will be open sourced and available at privl.sourceforge.net .
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Fig. 2. Implementation overview.
Architecture The current version of the application uploads users’ location on
any third-party LSS. We have currently implemented an interface for ipoki [6]
because it provides an open and detailed API. Users must first login in order get
their Friend list and to post their location. We provide users with a new feature
which allows them sharing their encrypted location: they upload the ciphertext
to a DHT and a reference to it on ipoki’s servers. Users have to generate random
pair-wise AES session keys and share them with friends using peer-to-peer com-
munications. Cryptographic operations as well as dummy queries are completely
transparent to users and do not affect the performances of the LSS application.
Our prototype was successfully tested on multiple standard mobile devices.
Technical Details To obtain users’ current position, we send nearby Cell Tower
information and the MAC addresses of nearby WiFi access points to the Google
Geolocation API [4]. While WiFi scanning is implemented with the SDK API
plug-in from Symbian C++ [15], the Cell Tower information is provided by the
QT Mobility API. The latter API also provides GPS support.
The localization and the visualization component require both caching of
data. While this is achieved in the first case by downloading all available access
points from Wigle.net within a user defined region, map caching is done by
activating the browsers native cache. These two components also make use of
dummy queries to enhance privacy. To make sure that dummy positions are
valid, we use locations from the list of WiFi access point of Wigle.net. Users’
position is shown on a map in a Webkit based browser. The map data is retrieved
from Google’s static map API [14] and we position placemarks with Javascript.
To provide ephemeral storage, we currently use the academic P2P Network
OpenDHT [8]. The interaction with this network is done according to the XML-
RPC protocol. The encryption of the user’s position relies on the AES Symmetric
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Fig. 3. Interface overview. (a) Main window showing users’ location with markers. (b)
Settings window enabling users to establish security associations, to connect to LSSs
and to setup their privacy requirements.
encryption algorithms which are provided by the EVP module of OpenSSL from
Nokia’s OpenC plugin.
The Graphical User Interface is implemented with QT’s GUI framework: it
is optimized for Symbian 5th Edition devices with touch screen. We rely also on
the QT Mobility API for the connection to the Internet (WiFi or 3G) and for
the interactions with the short message service (SMS).
4 Related Work
There are numerous types of location-based services [18,21,27,39] offering users
to connect with friends, to discover their environment or to optimize their mo-
bility. Hence, users can share their location in return for services. In this paper,
we focus on services that enable users to share their location with friends.
The need for selective access control in online social networks (OSNs) has
been identified in previous works and several solutions were proposed. Most of
these solutions implement add-ons to existing OSNs in order to protect user
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privacy. NOYB [31], for example, encrypts personal information using a pseudo-
random substitution cipher. FlyByNight [40] protects private data in Facebook
by storing it in encrypted form. We rely on an encryption primitive similar to
that discussed in [19] to encrypt data on LSSs.
Recently, a new breed of privacy-aware online social networks were pro-
posed [3,11]. Basically, these OSNs offer precise settings for users to control their
privacy. Effectively, all user data is still shared with the third-party running the
OSN. Other works proposed fine-grained control over the sharing of user loca-
tion [7]. This controls enable users to specify precisely with which friends they
wish to share their location and how. In this work, we focus on the protection
of users’ location with respect to third-parties.
Earlier work on privacy preserving localization tried to solve the problem
by caching on mobile devices the location of WiFi access points used for tri-
angulation [9]. However, it is costly to store on mobile devices entire database
of access points, and such databases may not offer a complete coverage of the
regions visited by users. In this work, we extend these existing mechanisms by
offering the ability to dynamically cache access points, and use dummy queries
when areas are not covered.
The generation of dummy location samples was previously evaluated [43] but
mostly with a focus on moving trajectories over a period of time. In this work,
we identified several new constraints that must also be taken into account, in
particular, we mentioned the use of virtual identities.
5 Conclusion
We have considered the problem of sharing user location privately over online
social networks. We show that encryption techniques can be used to protect
user location from LSSs. We note that this is not sufficient because other com-
ponents, such as localization and map visualization services, may also obtain
users’ location. We show how dummy queries and caching can help protect loca-
tion privacy. We observe that dummy queries generated at random are inefficient
against an adversary with statistical knowledge about user mobility. In the worst
case scenario (i.e., users are traceable), we argue that it is necessary to maintain
virtual identities generating dummy queries that are statistically indistinguish-
able from real users. We implemented the ideas of this paper in a prototype
client application code-named PrivL that can connect to any LSS.
In the future, we intend to test various dummy query and caching strate-
gies and evaluate their effectiveness in providing location privacy. We will also
evaluate the incentives of LSS operators to provide services to users that hide
their location. In particular, users could strategically reveal sample of their vis-
ited locations or obfuscated location information to provide incentives to LSS
operators.
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